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A Woman in Stone or in the Heart of Man? 
Navigating Between Naturalism and Idealism in the Spirit of Veritatis Splendor1 
Michelle Schumacher 
 
“What good is the poet in barren times?” (Friedrich Hölderlin)2 
In an encyclical whose purpose is “to reflect on the whole of the church’s moral 
teaching, with the precise goal of recalling certain fundamental truths of Catholic doctrine 
which, in the present circumstances, risk being distorted or denied,”3 one would expect—in 
keeping with tradition—that emphasis would be upon the “good [that] is to be done and 
pursued and [the] evil [that is] to be avoid.”4 What is particularly surprising in the approach of 
Pope John Paul II, then, is his focus upon truth and beauty, as the very name of the encyclical 
implies: Veritatis Splendor.5 
“Why is the ‘splendour of truth’ so important?” John Paul II asks within the context of 
his 1994 Letter to Families. 
First of all, by way of contrast: the development of contemporary civilization is linked 
to a scientific and technological progress which is often achieved in a one-sided way, and thus 
appears purely positivistic. Postivisim, as we know, results in agnosticism in theory and 
utilitarianism in practice and in ethics. In our own day, history is in a way repeating itself. 
Utilitarianism is a civilization of production and of use, a civilization of “things” and not of 
“persons”, a civilization in which persons are use in the same way as things are used. In the 
context of a civilization of use, woman can become an object for man, children a hindrance to 
parents, the family an institution obstructing the freedom of its members.6 
Or, as the Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar prophetically describes this 
utilitarian world, it is “a world without women, without children, without reverence for the 
form of love in poverty and humility, a world in which everything is viewed solely in terms of 
power or profit-margin, in which everything that is disinterested and gratuitous and useless is 
despised, persecuted, and wiped out, and even art is forced to wear the mask and the features 
of technique.”7 
What Balthasar herein recognizes as the consequence of the separation of nature and 
grace (or of divine and human causality), at least within the confines of much of 
contemporary thought, might also be formulated in terms of the typically modern conflict 
                                               
1
 Also published in Nova et Vetera, English Edition, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2013): 1249–86. 
2
 “… wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit” (From “Brot und Wein”) 
3
 John Paul II, Encyclical letter on “the Splendor of Truth,” Veritatis Splendor (August 6, 1993), no. 4. 
4
 St. Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2. 
5
 See Veritatis Splendor, no. 51, where John Paul II teaches that “to perfect himself in his specific order,” the 
human person must not only “do good and avoid evil,” but he must also “seek truth, practice good and 
contemplate beauty.” 
6
 John Paul II, Gratissimam Sane (2 February, 1994), no. 13. 
7
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible, translated by David C. Schindler (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2004), 142. 
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between human freedom and natural necessity.8 Such is also the origin of the modern idea of 
selfhood, resulting, as Louis Dupré observes, “either in a naturalist or in an idealist 
conception of the person.”9 
Both sides […] found it hard to preserve genuine otherness. A self-reduced to a 
meaning-giving function—a mere subject—loses its personal identity and, as a result, is no 
longer able to recognize the identity of the other. […] Likewise, if the self is merely a 
substance [in a Cartesian sense] albeit it a distinct one, it becomes absorbed within an 
objective totality that admits no real otherness.10 
Hence, as Kenneth Schmitz summaries, otherness is understood either “in terms of 
conflict (dialectics) or equivocity (deconstruction).”11 In the second sense, “The lonely man of 
today meets in the ‘thou’ only himself; he is,” Balthasar observes, “more narcissistic than ever 
before in the history of mankind.”12 
A way beyond this impasse—that of “the sharp subject-object division characteristic 
of modern philosophical anthropology”—is, Dupré suggests, recourse to the ideas of beauty 
and harmony: ideas which “do not allow themselves to be explained in either of those terms, 
even though aesthetic theories kept hesitating between the two, leaning at first more to the 
objective and later to the subjective side.”13 As for Blessed John Paul II, he follows the 
example of Christ in his dialogue with the rich young man (cf. Mt 19:16) by making “an 
appeal to the absolute good which attracts us and beckons us” as the “echo of a call from God, 
who is the origin and goal of man’s life.”14 As such, it is also an appeal to human freedom, 
insofar as it is understood—in the classic (pre-modern) sense—as “rooted in the soul’s 
spontaneous inclinations to the true and the good,”15 whence also his appeal to beauty: the 
shining forth (splendour) of the truth so that it might be savoured by the senses of sight and 
sound.16 
In the profound words of Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
                                               
8
 This modern tension between nature and freedom is fittingly portrayed by Michael Allen Gillespie in terms of 
the conflict between Thomas Hobbes and René Descartes, whom Gillespie presents as “prototypical modern 
thinkers” (The Theological Origins of Modernity [Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2008], 262). 
9
 Louis Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture (New Haven / London: 
Yale University Press, 2004), 76-77. 
10
 Ibid., 76. See also idem, The Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), 118-19. “The conceptual apparatus of modern thought, 
including much theology,” Dupré argues elsewhere, “has come to rest on the assumption that the subject-object 
opposition must be recognized as an ultimate” (idem, Metaphysics and Culture, The Aquinas Lecture, 1994 
[Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1994], 57). 
11
 Kenneth Schmitz, “Created Receptivity and the Philosophy of the Concrete,” The Thomist 61, no. 3 (1997), 
339-71, here 361. 
12
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The God Question and Modern Man, with foreword by John Macquarrie, translated 
by Hilda Graef (New York: Seabury Press, 1967), 106. 
13
 Louis Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture, 76. 
14
 Veritatis Splendor, no. 7. 
15
 Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, translated by Mary Thomas Noble from the third edition 
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 333. “For St. Thomas,” Pinckaers explains, 
“the natural inclinations to goodness, happiness, being and truth were the very source of freedom. They formed 
the will and intellect, whose union produced free will.” (ibid., 245). 
16
 See, for example, ST I, q. 5, a. 4, ad. 1. 
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“The form as it appears to us is beautiful only because the delight that it arouses in us 
is founded upon the fact that, in it, the truth and goodness of the depths of reality itself are 
manifested and bestowed. […] The appearance of the form, as revelation of the depths, is an 
indissoluble union of two things. It is the real presence of the depths, of the whole of reality, 
and it is a real pointing beyond itself to these depths. […] We “behold” the form; but, if we 
really behold it, it is not as a detached form, rather in its unit with the depths that make their 
appearance in it. We see form as the splendour, as the glory of Being. We are “enraptured” by 
our contemplation of these depths and are “transported” to them.”17 
What is thus proposed for our appropriation by Veritatis Splendor is a profoundly 
realist (or creational) perspective: one which affirms the goodness—and thus also the 
beauty—of things in themselves, and not simply from the perspective of the human subject, as 
goes the expression: beauty is in the eyes of the beholder. This, of course, is also a 
metaphysical perspective—one that literally goes surpasses the physical dimension—but one 
which nonetheless implies that truth might be perceived—even touched and heard—by the 
knowing subject, whence also John Paul II’s recourse at times to phenomenology, but a 
phenomenology based upon what he calls in one of his previous encyclicals a “contemplative 
outlook.” This, more specifically, is an outlook that arises from faith in the God of life, who 
has created every individual as a “wonder” (cf. Ps 139:14). It is the outlook of those who see 
life in its deeper meaning, who grasp its utter gratuitousness, its beauty and its invitation to 
freedom and responsibility. It is the outlook of those who do not presume to take possession 
of reality but instead accept it as a gift, discovering in all things the reflection of the Creator 
and seeing in every person his living image (cf. Gen 1:27; Ps 8:5).18 
In short, we are invited—within the specific context of his more recent encyclical, 
Veritatis Splendor—to uphold the “essential bond between Truth, the Good and Freedom,”19 
and to correct the current tendency of “detaching human freedom from its essential and 
constitutive relationship to truth”20—by recognizing and affirming a world that is simply 
given at the outset. Ours, John Paul II suggests, is a world which is bestowed as both a fact 
(datum) and a gift (donum): a world which, precisely as created, includes us and our freedom, 
but which is not simply or necessarily subject to us and our freedom; a world which is 
composed of relations and relationships that are given, but given in such a way as to be 
wilfully appropriated and fostered by human action: a world which beckons us “to see” and to 
affirm. After all, to contemplate, as the German philosopher Josef Pieper fittingly describes it, 
“means first of all to see—and not to think!”21 
From this perspective, the claim to truth supposes what Aquinas call the “conformity” 
(conformitas) or “equation” (adequatio)22—or what the Swiss theologian Hans Urs von 
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 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, I: Seeing the Form, translated by 
Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis and edited by Joseph Fessio and John Riches (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982, 
1989), 118, 119. See also ibid., 19-20; and Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity, 18. 
18
 John Paul II, Encyclical on the Gospel of Life, Evangelium Vitae (March 25, 1995), no. 83. 
19
 Cf. Veritatis Splendor, no. 84. 
20
 Ibid., no. 4. 
21
 Josef Pieper, Only the Lover Sings: Art and Contemplation, translated by Lothar Krauth (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1990), 73. 
22
 “True expresses the correspondence of being to the knowing power, for all knowing is produced by an 
assimilation of the knower to the thing known, so that assimilation is said to be the cause of knowledge. […] The 
first reference of being to the intellect, therefore, consists in its agreement with the intellect. This agreement is 
called ‘the conformity of thing and intellect.’ In this conformity is fulfilled the formal constituent of the true.” 
(De Veritate I, 1: “Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum. Omnis autem cognitio 
perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilation dicta est causa cognitionis 
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Balthasar calls “attunement” (Einstimmung)23—of our subjective consciousness (perception 
or conviction) to objective reality, of our mental and emotional states to the world that God 
has created, so as to act accordingly: to “assimilate” the truth, as John Paul II, puts it.24 Or, to 
put it in other words, truth and goodness imply the meeting of gifts: God’s goodness calling 
forth from human hearts the response of receptive willingness to acknowledge the world and 
ourselves as a gift that is not of our making, so as in turn to discern God’s project for the 
world and our lives and to act accordingly. As Balthasar reasons, “a person who contemplates 
a great work of art has to have a gift – whether inborn or acquired through training – to be 
able to perceive and assess its beauty, to distinguish it from mediocre art or kitsch.”25 
Similarly, or analogically, the human person is given to participate in God’s 
governance of the world precisely by means of his or her spiritual nature – consisting of 
intellect and will – wherein also consists his or her likeness to God and whereby he or she is 
capable of discerning God’s purpose for the world and for him- or herself in the world. Far 
from denying either the human person’s place within (rather than beyond or above) this world 
or his bodily being, which is constitutive of our nature as such (i.e. as human), this 
perspective thus requires that we be incarnated in the body and in the world. At the same 
time, it is a perspective which calls upon the natural aspirations of the human heart to rise, in 
ecstasy, above the limits of its own self towards that which is nonetheless proper to itself: the 
realization of the self within a communion of persons. As such, it is also an appeal to love: not 
as a projection of its self or its own desires upon the beloved, but as a profound affirmation of 
the beloved’s own goodness and beauty, radiating forth from his or her interior depths. 
In this article, I propose to apply these insights to the specific problematic of modern 
feminism, which arose, I will argue in part one, out of women’s rightful opposition to what I 
refer to as “the man-made woman”: a combination—in keeping with Dupré’s categories 
referred to above—of a naturalist, a dialectical, and an idealist conception (more in the 
Platonic than the Enlightenment sense) of woman. Such, is also, I will argue in this first part, 
the origin of the feminist refusal of the body, as “man” sees and manipulates it, but also as 
woman herself (that is to say, the feminist) sees it: namely as a means to oppression. In part 
two, I will present the modern conflict, so exemplary in the history of feminism, between 
nature and freedom and the consequential attempt of our contemporaries to re-make the 
human body. In part three, with the help of the distinction between what Karol Wojtyla calls 
the natural and the biological orders, I will present the positive challenge to adopt his 
“contemplative outlook” – upon the world and upon our body-selves. This, more specifically, 
I will argue in part four, is a regard which we might take as an invitation to “get out of our 
heads,” or to transcend the influence of modernity, much of which attempts to transcend the 
God-given world of creation within, ironically enough, the immanence of the finite human 
mind.26 In part five, I will argue that the consideration of the God-given value, or meaning, of 
                                                                                                                                                   
[…] Prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui correspndeat: quae quidem correspondentia, 
adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur; et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur.”) Marietti edition. English 
translation by Robert Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952). See also ST I, q. 16, a. 1; and Yves 
Floucat, La vérité selon saint Thomas d’Aquin. Le réalisme de la connaissance (Paris: Téqui, 2009). 
23
 See, for example, The Glory of the Lord I, 241ff. 
24
 See Veritatis Splendor, no. 52. 
25
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible, 75. 
26
 This is not to deny that the human soul is, as Aristotle taught, in some sense all things, nor that the human 
person is, according to the formulation of St. Augustine of Hippo (cf. De Trinitate, XIV, 8): “capax Dei,” 
capable of [the infinite] God, because capable of grace (cf. ST I-II, q. 113, a. 10 / De Veritate 22, 2, ad. 5). Nor 
still would we object to the teaching of Aquinas, according to which “it must be absolutely granted that the 
blessed see the essence of God” (ST I, q. 12, a. 1: “simpliciter concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam 
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womanhood sets us before a mystery of the self destined to communion. Herein, more 
specifically, we might discover both the destiny and the vocation to love and communion, as 
are inscribed within our bodies, but also within our souls: by, that is to say, our natural 
intrinsic orientation to truth and goodness, which we might analogically compare to the 
beautiful. From this perspective of the world as created by an all-loving and all-powerful God, 
human sexuality, I will reiterate, has a profoundly metaphysical value: one that literally 
transcends (meta) the physical. It is, in fact, the specifically spiritual nature of human persons 
– not withstanding the real fecundity of our bodies – which enables us to be co-creators with 
our God: artists by way of our attunement to the Creator’s mind and purpose. Something of 
this mystery of attunement might be explained, as we will see in part six, by the manner in 
which a human lover invites his beloved to “live up” to the image that he guards of her in his 
heart. Similarly, or analogically, we will argue, in concluding, that the Christian is invited by 
the loving regard of God, in his incarnate Son, to become who she or he is: the image and 
likeness of God. 
I. Feminist Opposition to the Man-Made Woman and the Subsequent Refusal of 
the Body as Given 
In order to better appreciate this creational perspective – which, as I mentioned will be 
treated more thoroughly in the third and concluding parts of this conference – we might first 
take a quick survey of feminist thought which often stands not only in contrast, but even in 
direct opposition to this perspective. This, I suggest we might do by turning to an ancient 
Greek legend, describing the delightful wonder of a young child who patiently observes a 
sculptor chiselling at a marble block. Eventually there emerges—after many months of 
persistent hard labour—a beautiful white horse. Upon perceiving the horse for the first time, 
the delighted child cries out to the sculptor with respectful awe: “How did you know that 
there was a horse in that stone?” 
We smile at the simplicity of the child who thinks that the artist’s work consists of 
setting free, as it were, the trapped horse. Yet many early feminists rightfully conceived of 
their work in precisely these terms: that of allowing woman (exemplified by the horse) to give 
expression to the fullness of her natural attributes which had been imprisoned, as it were, by 
social constraints prohibiting her from actualizing her God-given freedom in such a way as to 
realize herself and her destiny; whence the liberating work of freeing the horse from the heavy 
block of marble. For these early feminists, the block of marble might thus be interpreted as 
social expectations that not only weighed her down, but also subjected her to man’s vision of 
herself: a vision which all too often, as not only the well-known French feminist philosopher 
Simone de Beauvoir,27 but also Sr. Prudence Allen,28 Thomas Laqueur,29 and Sylviane 
                                                                                                                                                   
videant”). However, it is also important to admit that: “The faculty of seeing God […] does not belong to the 
created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of 
deiformity.” (ibid., a. 6:”Facultas autem videndi Deum non competit intellectui creato secundum suam naturam, 
sed per lumen gloriae, quod intellectum in quadam deiformitate constituit”). 
27
 See Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, translated and edited by H. M. Parshley (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1989. (Le deuxième sexe I: Les faits et les mythes; II: L’expérience vécue (Paris: Gallimard, 1949, 
1976). Beauvoir’s position will be exposed below. 
28
 See Prudence Allen, RSM, The Concept of Woman, I: The Aristotelian Revolution, 750 BC-AD 1250 (Grand 
Rapids, MI /Cambridge, UK: Eerdmanns, 1997); idem, The Concept of Woman II: The Early Humanist Reform, 
1250-1500 (Grand Rapids, MI / Cambridge, UK: Eerdmanns, 2002); and Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Ethical Equality 
in a New Feminism,” in Women in Christ: Towards a New Feminism, edited by Michele M. Schumacher (Grand 
Rapids, MI / Cambridge, UK: Eerdmanns, 2004), 285-296. 
29
 “I return again and again in this book to a problematic, unstable female body that is either a version of or 
wholly different from a generally unproblematic, stable male body. As feminist scholars have made abundantly 
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Agacinski30 and many others have very aptly argued, was merely a projection of man’s own 
identity as normative upon her or, at best, a projection of his own interests upon her; whence 
the emphasis upon her roles as his mistress or as the mother of his descendants and not as a 
person in her own right.31 
To be sure, the notion of woman was historically viewed as a co-relative term, which 
is not to admit that it merely corresponds to our ever-changing mental states and not to 
anything in the real world. Rather, by this designation I mean to point to the fact that we 
understand the meaning of the word woman (like the reality that it signifies) in terms of its 
(her) relation to another term (corresponding to another reality or being), namely man. Man, 
in contrast, is both a generic term for all that is human (so as to include the concept of 
woman) and a gendered term (specifying the male sex). “The masculine is a ‘gender’ which is 
defined less by its relation to the feminine [in much of the history of philosophy] than by the 
capacity to rise above sexual duality,” Sylviane Agacinski explains. “The masculine, like 
genus, is not in a relation of lateral opposition, if you will, to the feminine […] but in the 
position of a foundation: he is to the feminine that which the pure is to the impure, the 
primary to the second, the good to the evil, the original to the derived.”32 
This, in other words, is a profoundly androcentric account of sexual differentiation: “It 
is always the woman who differs from the man in the classic anthropological discourse, 
whether philosophical or theological,” Agacinski continues, “whereas the feminine is 
subordinate to the masculine. The woman differs from the man; never the inverse, as if the 
masculine point of view was neutral, that of the universal human genus (genre), whereas the 
feminine would be ‘gender’ (‘genre’) different from genus (genre), always a little degenerate, 
derived, exotic, failing, particular, minor.”33 
This distinction between the very broad concept of man and the necessarily restraint 
meaning of woman is perhaps the point at which much of the difficulty in gender theory – or 
better said, the “ideology”34 of gender – begins. For unlike the concept of man, which is 
                                                                                                                                                   
clear, it is always woman’s sexuality that is being constituted; woman is the empty category. Woman alone 
seems to have ‘gender’ since the category itself is defined as that aspect of social relations based on difference 
between sexes in which the standard has always been man.” (Thomas Laqueur, The Making of Sex: Body and 
Gender from the Greeks to Freud [Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press,1990], 22). 
30
 See Sylviane Agacinski, Métaphysique des sexes. Masculin / Féminin aux sources du christianisme (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 2005). Agaskinski’s position will be exposed below. 
31
 Sylviane Agacinski contrast’s Beauvoir’s theory according to which a woman’s fecundity “constitutes a 
natural inferiority and a handicap” with that of Françoise Hériter, who recognizes in the traditional hierarchy of 
the sexes the effect of men’s attempt to control reproduction. One might in fact, Agacinski reasons, imagine that 
“a man’s uncertainty about his own paternity, as well as his incapacity to fully master the process of conception, 
constitute a handicap for him, inciting him to appropriate one or more women so as to be assured of 
descendants.” (Ibid., 83). Agacinski holds to the second of these hypotheses as more probable. 
32
 Ibid., 8. See also Michele M. Schumacher, “The ‘Nature’ of Nature in Feminism: From Dualism to Unity” in 
idem (ed.), Women in Christ: Towards a New Feminism (Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, MI, 2004), 17-51. 
33
 Ibid., 9. 
34
 It is not without good reason, as shall become increasingly apparent, that Élizabeth Montfort prefers to speak 
of the “ideology of gender” than “the theory of gender.” In using the term “theory,” its proponents would have us 
believe that it is an already validated scientific hypothesis, when in fact it is only “an opinion at best an opinion, 
an ideology at worst.” (Élizabeth Montfort, Le genre démasqué. Homme ou femme ? Le choix impossible 
[Valence: Éditions Peuple Libre, 2011], 15). Marguerite Peeters, on the other hand, argues that gender is “not an 
ideology in the proper sense of the term,” since the word “evokes systems of thought linked to Western 
modernity,” and gender is, she insists, “a postmodern phenomenon.” (Marguerite A. Peeters, “Gender: An 
Anthropological Deconstruction and a Challenge for Faith” in Pontificium Consilium pro Laicis, Woman and 
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linguistically and philosophically associated with all that is human, that of women is one 
which can never be hidden in the general. Woman is always specified by her sex; whence the 
problematic encounter that much of modernity sought to avoid: the confrontation between the 
general and the specific (or the particular and the universal), a confrontation which inevitably 
challenges the modern idea of the human being as self-creating, and which, as John Paul II 
explains in Veritatis Splendor, obscures “the perception of the universality of the moral law 
on the part of reason.”35 Here, in other words, we are confronted with the idea that there is 
something necessary about being a woman: something that is determined at the outset and not 
accorded to her in virtue of her own freedom.  
At the same time, the specificity of the concept of woman sets man before another 
being who is not simply a projection of himself or of his idea of the world; whence man’s 
presentation of woman as “Other.” As Simone de Beauvoir, would have it in her now classic 
argument: “She [woman] is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with 
reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the 
Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other.”36 
Certainly, feminists had good reason to argue against this reductionist vision of 
woman – a vision making of her the exception to the masculine rule and not a person in her 
own right – but they did not always respond in such a way as to protect women’s best 
interests: her interests qua woman. In view of obtaining a place in a man’s world, they all too 
often simply played by his rules, as Elisabeth Badinter37 approvingly remarks and Gertrude 
von le Fort, disapprovingly.38 They adapted man’s vision of the world and of the human – 
which, of course, was that of the normative male – obscuring any traits that might distinguish 
her from man, with her life-bearing potentiality at the top of the list. Seeking, more 
specifically, to divert man’s objectifying regard – one which would render woman nothing 
more than the object of man’s interest (what Jean-Paul Sartre calls an “in-itself,” an “en soi,” 
as differing from a “for-itself,” a “pour soi” / corresponding roughly to the difference between 
an object and a subject),39 early feminist philosophers and theoreticians simply conformed to 
the masculine norm of personhood, freedom, and sex,40 whence the appropriate title of a 
recent book in French, L’Homme est l’avenir de la femme (“Man is the future of woman”).41 
                                                                                                                                                   
Man: The Humanum in its Entirety. International Congress on the 20th anniversary of John Paul II’s Apostolic 
Letter, Mulieris Dignitatem, 1988-2008 [Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2010], 289-99, here 289, 
290). 
35
 John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, no. 51 
36
 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, xxii. 
37
 See her Dead End Feminism, translated by Julia Borossa (Cambridge / Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006). 
[Fausse route (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2003)]. 
38
 “She [the early feminist] tried to share man’s intellectual world and sank to the level merely of his methods. In 
the social world she sought for space to develop her deepest potentialities and allowed herself instead to be 
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“Man’s design,” as Simone de Beauvoir saw it, for example, “is not to repeat himself 
in time [to reproduce descendants]: it is to take control of the instant and mold the future. It is 
male activity that in creating values has made of existence itself a value [whence the 
distinction between living in a properly human, i.e. rational, manner and simply living]; this 
activity has prevailed over the confused forces of life; it has subdued Nature and Woman.” 
This subjection has occurred, Beauvoir reasons, by way of a sort of identification of women 
with nature. “Men,” she argues, “have presumed to create a feminine domain – the kingdom 
of life, of immanence – only in order to lock up women therein.”42 
Such, more specifically, is what Beauvoir calls the paternalistic “myth” defining 
woman “as sentiment, inwardness, immanence.”43 “If, [in fact, Beauvoir reasons,] well before 
puberty and sometimes even from early infancy, she [the little girl] seems to us to be already 
sexually determined, this is not because mysterious instincts directly doom her to passivity, 
coquetry, maternity; it is because the influence of others upon the child is a factor almost from 
the start, and thus she is indoctrinated with her vocation from her earliest years.”44 
With these words from The Second Sex, published in 1949, Beauvoir might well have 
inaugurated the important distinction, which later feminists theoreticians will name sex and 
gender: the distinction, in other words, between that which is naturally or biologically 
determined in sexual differentiation and that which is socially, or culturally, determined; or to 
put it in terms of behavioural psychology, between nature and nurture. Hence the famous 
Beauvoirian phrase: “One is not born, but rather becomes a woman.”45 Curiously, however, 
she does not drive a wedge between the two as do later theoreticians, as we shall see, by 
arguing that there is no connection between the female body and the manner in which it is 
culturally presented.46 Instead, she drives a wedge between woman’s spirit and her body, so 
as, in fact, to actually fuel the argument in favour of biological determinism.  
To be sure, Beauvoir must be applauded for her refusal to admit, as did later feminists, 
a division between man and woman which would polarize them into two species, as it were.47 
“To pose Woman,” Beauvoir objects, “is to pose the absolute Other, without reciprocity, 
denying against all experience that she is a subject, a fellow human being.”48 In this context 
the famous French feminist appears to endorse what Pope John Paul II will present nearly 40 
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years later as “another ‘I’ in a common humanity.”49 Beauvoir nonetheless – and in this she 
obviously differs from the approach of John Paul II – goes so far in her argument for the 
equality of the sexes that she simply alleviates the differences between them, with the result 
that they can no longer be viewed as a “unity of the two,” a “uni-duality,” or a communion of 
persons preserving the “specific diversity and personal originality” of both sexes.50 
At first view of her work, it might appear as if Beauvoir is taking up the important 
feminist argument against biological determinism: the reduction of woman to what lies within 
the realm of her body and its working, as is expressed in the “anatomy is destiny” philosophy. 
Such, more specifically, is the notion that a woman’s identity is inscribed in her body, as in 
stone (or marble, to return to the image above): an idea which is at odds with the metaphysical 
meaning of human sexuality, as I will expose it below. Beauvoir, however, does not so much 
present women as “condemned to passivity by society, according to an arbitrary decree of 
men,” as (instead) “maintained in an inertia to which nature had initially destined them.” 
Hence, French philosopher Sylviane Agacinski reasons, she might just as well have admitted 
to biological determinism from the outset and written instead: “one does not become, but 
remains, a woman.”51 Or to put it otherwise: precisely in order to avoid the idea of a properly 
feminine nature which men (or so Beauvoir believes) had in their creation of culture, aligned 
with the animal (or sub-rational) realm at odds with the normative male (or rational) nature,52 
Beauvoir simply refuses to grant any metaphysical content to sexual differences.53 In so 
doing, she creates a dualism within woman herself: a dualism between her body and her soul, 
or between nature, understood in the most base sense of the term – namely that which is sub-
rational and fully determined – and reason, which is considered as constituting the essence of 
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the human. Admitting that it is woman’s “misfortune” to be “biologically destined”54 to 
transmit life and thus “more enslaved to the species”55 than is man, Beauvoir thus counsels 
her to flee the body and its constraints: to rise above the so-called “animal” act of giving life 
and to participate instead in the properly masculine act of risking life, beginning (presumably) 
with her battle against men.56 
One could hardly provide a better example of what Pope John Paul II presents as “the 
tension between freedom and a nature conceived of in a reductive way,” a tension which is 
finally “resolved,” he explains, “by a division within man himself”57 or, in this case, woman 
herself, and ultimately within the communion of man and woman, the fundamental cell of the 
family and thus also of society. 
II. The Nature-Freedom Conflict of Modernity and the Re-Making of the Human 
Body 
Here, in the reasoning of Beauvoir, like that of so many other feminists following in 
her wake,58 we are confronted, more specifically, with the presumed conflict, marking the 
history of modernity, between human freedom, which has become supreme, and the idea of a 
God-given nature which is ironically understood as lying entirely within the physical (sub-
rational) realm. As such – as material and thus as immanent – nature is also, or consequently, 
subject to man’s manipulative efforts. At times within this history, John Paul II instructs us in 
Veritatis Splendor, “it seemed that ‘nature’ subjected man totally to its own dynamics and 
even its own unbreakable laws.” Even today, he continues, certain ethicists are “tempted to 
take as the standard for their discipline and even for its operative norms the results of a 
statistical study of concrete human behaviour patterns and the opinions about morality 
encountered in the majority of people.” Others, more “sensitive to the dignity of freedom” 
conceive of it as opposed to or “in conflict with material and biological nature, over which it 
must progressively assert itself.” Hence, the origin of two contrasting, even opposed, 
understandings of nature: 
For some, “nature” becomes reduced to raw material for human activity and for its 
power: thus nature needs to be profoundly transformed, and indeed overcome by freedom, 
inasmuch as it represents a limitation and denial of freedom. For others, it is in the 
untrammeled advancement of man's power, or of his freedom, that economic, cultural, social 
and even moral values are established: nature would thus come to mean everything found in 
man and the world apart from freedom. In such an understanding, nature would include in the 
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first place the human body, its make-up and its processes: against this physical datum would 
be opposed whatever is “constructed”, in other words “culture”, seen as the product and result 
of freedom. Human nature, understood in this way, could be reduced to and treated as a 
readily available biological or social material. This ultimately means making freedom self-
defining and a phenomenon creative of itself and its values. Indeed, when all is said and done 
man would not even have a nature; he would be his own personal life-project. Man would be 
nothing more than his own freedom!59 
As a case in point, we need only think of the contemporary ideology of gender. 
Whereas gender was once regarded as a cultural expression of biological sex, recent 
theoreticians argue that it is culture (and thus gender) that determines bodily sex and not, the 
inverse (sex that determines gender). “[T]here is no recourse to a body that has not always 
already been interpreted by cultural meanings;” reasons humanities professor Judith Butler. 
“[H]ence, sex could not qualify as a prediscursive anatomical facticity. Indeed, sex, by 
definition, will be shown to have been gender all along.”60 As for gender, this term must not 
be understood as being related to culture “as sex is to nature,” Butler argues. Rather, gender 
should be understood, she continues, as “the discursive/cultural means by which ‘sexed 
nature’ or ‘a natural sex’ is produced and established as ‘prediscursive,’ prior to culture, a 
politically neutral surface on which culture acts.”61 Sex, in other words, is thought to have no 
intrinsic meaning or content that is not first given to it by culture.  
Butler’s claim is supported, at least implicitly, by history professor Thomas Laqueur, 
who seeks to “offer [historial] material [or accounts] for [demonstrating] how powerful prior 
notions of difference or sameness determine what one sees and reports about the body,” and 
thus for “deciding what counts and what does not count as evidence.”62 Laqueur thus makes 
“every effort,” as he puts it, “to show that no historically given set of facts about ‘sex’ 
entailed how sexual difference was in fact understood and represented […], and I use this 
evidence,” he continues, “to make the more general claim that no set of facts ever entails any 
particular account of difference.”63 As for biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling, she argues that 
“labelling someone a man or a woman is a social decision. We may use scientific knowledge 
to help us make the decision, but only our beliefs about gender – not science – can define our 
sex. Furthermore, our beliefs about gender affect what kinds of knowledge scientists produce 
about sex in the first place.”64 In other words, scientists “create truths about sexuality,” which 
are subsequently incorporated and confirmed by our bodies.65 Indeed, Fausto-Sterling’s own 
analysis of the “construction of sexuality” and her preference for “theories of sexuality that 
allow for flexibility and the development of new behaviour patterns” can hardly be divorced 
from her own “deep” commitment “to the ideas of the modern movements of gay and 
women’s liberation”66 and from her personal experience of living, as she puts it, “part of her 
life as an unabashed heterosexual, part as an unabashed lesbian, and part in transition.”67 
Denied from the outset is what she calls – borrowing from Donna Haraway –“the God 
trick”: “producing,” that is to say, “knowledge from above, from a place that denies the 
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individual scholar’s location in a real and troubled world.”68 Such, more specifically, she 
suggests, is a world in which it is not always so easy to determine – biologically-speaking – 
whether a child is male or female. 
If a child is born with two X chromosomes, oviducts, ovaries, and a uterus on the 
inside, but a penis and scrotum on the outside, for instance, is the child a boy or a girl? Most 
doctors declare the child a girl, despite the penis, because of her potential to give birth, and 
intervene using surgery and hormones to carry out the decision. Choosing which criteria to 
use in determining sex, and choosing to make the determination at all, are social decisions for 
which scientists can offer no absolute guidelines.69 
It is thus not surprising that Judith Butler should ask the question: What is ‘sex’ 
anyway? Is it natural, anatomical, chromosomal, or hormonal, and how is a feminist critic to 
assess the scientific discourses which purport to establish such ‘facts’ for us?”70 
One could hardly find a better question for introducing the important distinction, 
which will also serve my transition between this brief exposition of feminist teaching on what 
constitutes womanhood as such and a classic metaphysical (and thus also realist) 
understanding of the same. This, more specifically, is the distinction made by Karol Wojtyla 
between the biological order and “the order of nature.” 
III. The Biological Order and the Order of Nature: An Important Distinction 
Unlike most feminist and gender theoreticians today – who simply equate nature and 
biology or a naturalist philosophy (passing as physicalism) and natural law – Wojtyla presents 
biology as “a product of the human intellect which abstracts its elements from a larger reality, 
[and which] has man for its immediate author. The claim to autonomy in one’s ethical views,” 
he further maintains, “is a short jump from this.” In other words, when man is seen as the 
creator of the world order, relativism is the most logical ethical theory: how can one defend 
the idea of universal truths and even the idea of intrinsic human dignity, when man creates 
man? “It is otherwise,” Wojtyla continues, “with the order of nature, which means the totality 
of the cosmic relationships that arise among really existing entities.”71 
As we have seen in the foregoing exposition, it is this totality of relationships, which 
are not only realized by human freedom but also and most especially given to human 
freedom, that is denied by much feminist literature, beginning with the fundamental and 
constitutive relation between the human body and spirit, which precisely as unified, is, John 
Paul II teaches, the subject of moral acts.72 “Only in reference to the human person in his 
‘unified totality’, that is, as ‘a soul which expresses itself in a body and a body informed by an 
immortal spirit’, can the specifically human meaning of the body be grasped,” John Paul II 
teaches in Veritatis Splendor. It thus follows, according to Church teaching, that natural 
inclinations have “moral relevance only insofar as they refer to the human person and his 
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authentic fulfilment, a fulfilment,” John Paul II adds, which “can take place always and only 
in human nature.”73 
In fact, natural law refers, he further teaches, to “the ‘nature of the human person’, 
which is the person himself in the unity of soul and body, in the unity of [both] his spiritual 
and biological inclinations and of all the other specific characteristics necessary for the 
pursuit of his end. ‘The natural moral law expresses and lays down the purposes” of human 
life, which is to say, that we are created with divine intent and not chaotically set into a 
chaotic world so as to find our own chaotic way. At the same time, natural law is considered 
moral precisely because it also lays down the “rights and duties” of the human person, which 
John Paul II presents as “based” upon his or her “bodily and spiritual nature.” “Therefore this 
law cannot be thought of as simply a set of norms on the biological level [so as to be reduced 
to that which we share with sub-rational creation]; rather it must be defined as the rational 
order whereby man [that is to say, man and woman] is called by the Creator to direct and 
regulate his [or her] life and actions and in particular to make use of his [or her] own 
body’.”74 And, because human nature always includes human freedom, natural law not only 
cannot be interpreted as physicalism or naturalism, such that moral laws are reduced to 
“biological laws,”75 but it also will allow for no division between freedom and nature. 
“Indeed, these two realities are harmoniously bound together,” John Paul II insists, “and each 
is intimately linked to the other.”76 
This, in turn, means that we cannot assent to the proposition according to which the 
human person, precisely “as a rational being not only can but actually must freely determine 
the meaning of his [or her] behaviour,”77 and thus surmount or transcend his or her bodily 
limitations. Just as the human person cannot be reduced to his or her bodily structure and its 
functioning, so also he or she “cannot,” John Paul II teaches, “be reduced to a freedom which 
is self-designing.” Human freedom quite simply “entails,” as he puts it “a particular spiritual 
and bodily structure.”78 
Such a metaphysical perspective of human nature – one which, it bears repeating, 
literally transcends (meta) the physical – does not only have implications upon the manner in 
which we perceive natural law and human freedom. It also affects the way we view human 
sexuality. As the Catechism puts it so well, sexuality “affects all aspects of the human person 
in the unity of his [or her] body and soul” and thus also, more specifically, of “affectivity, the 
capacity to love and to procreate, and in a more general way the aptitude for forming bonds of 
communion with others.”79 It follows that this primal unity of the body and the soul, 
constituting the human person as such, has profound implications upon the other cosmic 
relations to which Wojtyla refers with his distinction between the biological and natural 
orders, beginning with the relation of the family, that “first and fundamental school of social 
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living,”80 and still more fundamentally, the relation between man and woman, who are “called 
from the beginning […] not only to exist ‘side by side’ or ‘together,’” but also, John Paul II 
teaches, “to exist mutually ‘one for the other.’”81 
When God-Yahweh says, “It is not good that the man should be alone” (Gen 2:18), he 
affirms that, “alone,” the man does not completely realize this essence. He realizes it only by 
existing “with someone” – and, put even more deeply and completely, by existing “for 
someone.” (…) Communion of persons means living in a reciprocal “for,” in a relationship of 
reciprocal gift.82 
From this perspective – that of creation – human sexuality is not simply arbitrary; nor 
is it merely “skin deep.” Rather, it is orientated – precisely as an essential aspect of human 
nature – to the vocation implied within the very gift of human nature, as rational. This, in 
turn, does not meant that human sexuality is simply subject to human freedom; for it is not 
human freedom that has brought it into existence, nor human freedom that gives it meaning. 
Rather, both freedom and sexuality are subject together, in a body-spirit unity, to the divinely-
ordained meaning of human existence: a meaning which Christ has revealed as love. It is 
freedom’s role to discover this meaning and to constantly discern its own intentions according 
to this standard (the meaning of love), so as also to direct the whole person (body and soul) 
toward what is worthy of love. It is the body’s role, in turn, to serve reason in its discernment 
of the Creator’s intentions; for it is in virtue of the body that we enter into relation with all of 
material reality – we need only think of the role of the senses, which require direct contact 
with that which is thereby perceived – and it is also in virtue of the body that we enter into 
relationships with other body-persons. “The person, by the light of reason and the support of 
virtue, [thus] discovers in the body,” John Paul II teaches, “the anticipatory signs, the 
expression and the promise of the gift of self, in conformity with the wise plan of the 
Creator.”83 
To assent to this proposition – that the body expresses the Creator’s intentions for us –
one must have a certain confidence in reality: confidence – or better said, faith – that things 
really do bespeak the intentions of a wholly benevolent and supremely intelligent Creator who 
orders all things to their good in accord with the natures that He has bestowed upon them at 
the moment of creation. This in no way denies – rather it reinforces – the teaching of classic 
natural law theory according to which God orders human creatures “in the most excellent 
manner,”84 namely by giving us the capacity to govern ourselves: not in an anarchical sense – 
as creatures who deem themselves no longer subject to divine rule and order – but as capable, 
in virtue of our intelligent nature, of discerning God’s will and of acting accordingly, that is to 
say, virtuously.  
In the unavoidable confrontation with sexual differentiation, which marks the history 
of humankind from its inception, the human person is thus presented with a mystery that is 
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simultaneously given, in virtue of creation, and appropriated, in virtue of human freedom.85 
This, in other words, is a mystery which is given in both the creative and gratuitous senses of 
the word: a fact robed in gratuity. As such, it transcends the expertise of both the biological 
and the social sciences, evoking a reality that is not of our making, but that is nonetheless 
knowable and desirable to us. This, more specifically, is – as has been my purpose to argue – 
a reality which does not merely exist in our consciousness, but which, on the contrary, is 
offered to our consciousness in view of our willing appropriation and collaboration. As such, 
it is at once a gift and a call. 
To be human means to be called to interpersonal communion. […] The whole of 
human history unfolds within the context of this call. In this history, on the basis of the 
principle of mutually being “for” the other, in interpersonal “communion,” there develops in 
humanity itself, in accordance with God’s will, the integration of what is “masculine” and 
what is “feminine.”86 
Or to put it otherwise (again, in the words of Blessed John Paul II): “Human life is by 
its nature ‘co-educational,’ and its dignity as well as its balance depend at every moment of 
history and in every place of geographic longitude and latitude on ‘who’ she shall be for him 
and he for her.”87 
IV. An Objective Regard upon Woman: An Invitation to Get Out of Our Heads 
While this particular question or call is necessarily personal, it also has a social 
dimension; for precisely in the vis-à-vis, which sexual differentiation represents, modern men 
and women are offered a perspective that forces them to get out of their heads, as it were, and 
to confront an objective reality which is not of their making. An object cannot protect itself 
from someone’s false understanding of its being, nor from his or her manipulative tactics or 
misuse of its God-ordained purpose in the world. A person, however – and obviously I have 
woman in mind – can well object to man’s idea of herself and of her destiny, as Beauvoir 
rightly insisted, and thus also to his manipulative regard upon her. Here, then, in the 
encounter or confrontation of persons, there is also an encounter or confrontation with real 
objectivity: of a world which is not necessarily subject to man’s ideas and purposes, a world 
which invites an objective regard, or a perspective of truth in the classic understanding of the 
term, namely an adequation – or what Hans Urs von Balthasar calls “attunement” – between 
perception and reality, between subject and object, between knower and known.  
From this perspective – that of a given (even gratuitously-given) reality – the 
challenge of addressing sexual difference is not simply that of rethinking the way we 
approach scientific knowledge; for the fundamental question is more philosophical than 
experimental. This, to be precise, entails an epistemological question: one concerning how we 
view knowledge and knowing, and how we distinguish the two (the reality known from the 
process of knowing). When, in other words, we are confronted with the question of what is 
entailed in being a woman, as distinct from being a man – the question motivating John Paul 
II’s important apostolic letter, Mulieris dignitatem88– we are simultaneously confronted 
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within our present cultural situation with a more fundamental, or preliminary, question: that 
of what constitutes knowledge in the first place. This, more specifically, is the question of 
whether knowing entails a manipulation of reality – a sort of bending of the known according 
to my field of interest, such that the object (or person, as the case may be) must succumb to 
my preconceived notion of the real (whence Beauvoir’s theory of Woman as ‘Other’) – or 
whether, instead, knowing entails a conformity of my knowing powers to an objective reality: 
to the object known. In the latter case, it is I who, in fact or at least as a matter of speaking, 
must bend to the object, allowing it to speak to me, as it were, to inform me, to impress itself 
upon me, or to otherwise enrich me with its intrinsic goodness and beauty.  
Entailed in the question of womanhood – the problem of discerning its content or 
meaning – is thus the question of our philosophical perspective: the question of whether I 
hold to a modern perspective, according to which the meaning of womanhood is determined, 
or at least measured by, my inner, subjective, convictions; to a nihilistic position, according to 
which the notion of woman signifies absolutely nothing at all; to an existentialist perspective 
of the Sartrian kind (which is also that of Beauvoir), according to which woman is defined 
either by her own freedom or by that of man who constantly seeks to determine her for his 
own purposes or desires; to a constructionist standpoint, which considers her as an ever-
evolving social construct with no intrinsic meaning; to a post-modern stance, according to 
which the meaning of “woman” is determined by opposition: not in the co-relative sense of 
the term, but in the violent struggle between the oppressed (in this case, woman) and the 
oppressor (man); or, finally, to a realist perspective, according to which the content that we 
assign to the word “woman,” exists in reality and not merely in our heads: a position which is 
maintained, at least indirectly, by those who argue that human sexuality is socially 
constructed). 
To admit to this realist position – as I hope by now to have made clear – is hardly to 
reduce woman to a purely material being. Nor is it to take from her the freedom of self-
determination (as distinct from self-designing or self-creating) or to remove her from the 
romantic world of mystery and the creative world of art. Nor, still, is it to separate her from 
the loving and providential regard of her Creator. Rather, it means grounding, and thus 
safeguarding, her freedom in her God-given human nature, such that she is free with a 
freedom destined for what is good and true and noble: a freedom which is realized in self-gift, 
because the person is realized in communion. “Freedom,” Karol Wojyla explains, “exists for 
love,” which in turn means the “limit[ing] of one’s freedom on behalf of another.” It follows, 
Woytla reasons, that the human being “longs for love more than for freedom – freedom is the 
means and love the end.”89 
Far from the very restrained, or negative sense of freedom which has marked much of 
modernity, in general, and feminism, in particular – freedom from oppression, for example, or 
freedom from constraint – we are thus invited to consider it as having a positive value in 
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virtue of its God-given purpose: freedom for the other, freedom to give of oneself, and 
freedom to receive the other as a gift.90 
V. The Beauty of Truth and the Attunement to the Real 
By introducing the important distinction between the biological order and the natural 
order, Wojtyla – who, as we have seen, draws upon this important distinction in his papal 
teaching – does not therefore suggest that we might ascribe to some sort of Platonic idea of 
womanhood: to, that is to say, an eternal ideal qualifying woman from above, to return to 
Haraway’s objection to the so-called “God trick.” Rather, a natural law perspective supposes 
that the human being is intrinsically ordered by his or her Creator from within: not by way of 
a simple submission to the body, its needs and desires, but in the particularly human way of 
freely choosing one’s life’s goal in conformity with reason and faith and of acting 
accordingly. It follows that the divine Artist does not simply “draw forms, as it were, from the 
interior of matter, of wood, of stone, of marble”—to return to the image of the horse in the 
stone—so as to act “on the matter—let us say, even against it,” as does the human artist, as he 
is fittingly depicted by Pierre-Marie Emonet: 
Michelangelo has defined sculpture: the forza di levare—the “power to lift” the 
superfluous stone from around the form, the figure within. And Michelangelo trimmed with 
chisels and hammers, sending shots of matter to all sides. There is nothing of this in the divine 
acting. […] “When God awakens a new reality, first, he does not act on things, or against 
things—as we are obliged to do. God works in them.”91 
The divine Artist, in other words, is One whose “creative power” might be found “in 
the depths of things,”92 for the “divine influx passes […] through natural agents,” who are 
thus “elevated to the order of instrumental causes of the divine causality.”93 
As for human agents, precisely as free, we are given by the Creator the power to direct 
our lives and to govern the world that He entrusts to us in view of a certain world-order – that 
of the various cosmic relations implied by God’s creative act, including most especially the 
relation between man and woman – all of which ought to be subject to the fundamental good 
of God, whom revelation teaches us, is the final end of the human person. Or to put it still 
more directly, we are thus set before the specific task of rationally discerning God’s purpose 
for our lives, so as to act accordingly. Such, I would suggest again, is not far from what 
Balthasar describes as attunement. 
This musical image – precisely as artistic – invites us to return to the image of the 
horse in the marble block from still another perspective: that of a classic understanding of art. 
Here we have, Francesca Murphy rightly suggests, a vision “for a post-modern society, in 
which the idea of a common rationality is threadbare,”94 but in which the basic human desire 
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for love and beauty is not entirely lost; for the human being remains human and as such 
profoundly orientated by nature to what is good and true and thus also beautiful. The 
Christian – whom Balthasar presents as the “guardian of that metaphysical wonderment which 
is the point of origin for philosophy”95 – nonetheless has a very important role to play in 
awakening this natural human desire within the men and women of our time. After all, the 
very world, which for our contemporaries is characterized by the “elimination of the sacred 
and the loss of the ‘power of the heart’ (Siewerth) to sense the ‘majesty of being’ (Hans 
André) in the immediacy of God”—a world which has “no Godward tendency (since it was 
become mere matter, an accumulation of facts and its synthesis is man in his state of 
wretchedness)” is, Balthasar rightly notes, a world which nonetheless remains sacred for the 
Christian as inhabited—even impregnated—by “something of eternity.”96 It follows, as 
Balthasar rightly perceives, that only the Christian is joining children in posing the essential 
question of being upon which metaphysical inquiry is based: the question, born of 
wonderment, as typified by the delighted child discovering the horse in the marble block.97 
This, more specifically, is the question: “Why is there anything rather than nothing at all?”  
The failure to pose this question is, John Paul II suggests, typical of an impoverished 
society motivated by the desire “to possess things rather than to relate them to the truth.” This, 
more specifically, he suggests, is a society “lacking that disinterested, unselfish and aesthetic 
attitude that is born of wonder in the presence of being and of the beauty which enables one to 
see in visible things the message of the invisible God who created them.”98 Such, he suggests 
in Veritatis Splendor, is a society for whom beauty, but also goodness, has been isolated from 
truth. 
To be sure, it is unthinkable for the modern or contemporary mind to refer to beauty as 
“true” or even “good,” for we are much too inclined to admit—as I implied in my 
introduction—that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Balthasar does not hesitate, however, 
to address the idea of “aesthetic measure.”99 As for St. Thomas, he too insists upon the 
objective dimension of beauty: “Something is not beautiful because we love it; rather, it is 
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loved by us because it is beautiful and good.”100 Not surprisingly, then, the angelic doctor lists 
three conditions of beauty: “integrity or perfection, since those things which are impaired are 
by the very fact ugly; due proportion or harmony; and lastly, brightness, or clarity, whence 
things are called beautiful which have a bright colour.”101 Ultimately this means, as Balthasar 
sees it, that “The light of the transcendentals, unity, truth, goodness and beauty, a light at one 
with the light of philosophy, can only shine if it is undivided. A transcendence of beauty alone 
is not viable.”102 On the other hand, and more positively, “the beautiful is implied in the order 
of truth and goodness.”103 In fact, Aquinas maintains that “beauty and goodness in a thing are 
identical fundamentally,” with this difference: “beauty relates to the cognitive faculty,” 
whereas “goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire).”104 
By classing the beautiful among the transcendentals, we mean that it has, as the name 
implies, an intrinsically transcendent dimension, in virtue of which it draws (or literally 
“trans-ports”) its beholder out of the immanence of this world. The manifestation of the 
beautiful, like that of Being in its other transcendental properties (those of truth, goodness and 
unity), “invites the creaturely spirit,” Balthasar explains, “to move away from and beyond 
itself and [to] entrust and surrender itself to that mystery”105: that of beauty, in the case at 
hand. In this sense, at least, the encounter between a great work of art and its beholder is 
necessarily ecstatic: it causes one to stand (stasis) out (ex) of one’s own self. Art might thus 
rightly be personified, for here the object (a work of art) acts as a subject: it exercises a sort of 
bewitching, or enchanting influence upon the one who beholds it: like a charm, whence the 
word charming. As such, it nonetheless testifies to the truth of an objective world, which is 
open to the transcendental realm: to, that is to say, a dimension beyond the confines of the 
subject and of his spiritual powers of imagination and projection.  
It is not only this encounter between art and its beholder that is characterized by 
ecstasy, however, for Balthasar argues that the artist himself – precisely in his greatest 
moment of genius – is also so marked by it.  
[I]n the phenomenon of inspiration there exists a moment which the heathen has 
always sensed but which only the Christian can grasp with all the preciseness of faith. This is 
the moment when one’s own inspiration mysteriously passes over into inspiration through the 
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genius, the daimon, or the indwelling god, a moment when the “spirit that contains the god” 
(en-thusiasmos) obeys a superior command which as such implies form and is able to impose 
form.106 
When, in other words, the artist acts by inspiration, he cannot be considered as simply 
imposing upon a marble block a vision out of his self-consciousness or even out of his own 
necessarily limited imagination: limited by what he has seen and experienced; for as 
Ecclesiastics puts it all too well, “What has been will be again, what has been done will be 
done again; there is nothing new under the sun” (1:9). In the moment of inspiration, in 
contrast, there is something radically new that shines upon the horizon, something that 
literally breaks into time and man’s perspective from outside of his time and perspective.  
A similar phenomenon occurs when one is overtaken by love or beauty. Dante might 
well have immortalized the lovely Beatrice, but only after her incredible beauty inspired him 
to greatness, transporting him outside of himself: 
And when this most gracious being actually bestowed the saving power of her 
salutation, I do not say that Love as an intermediary could dim for me such unendurable bliss 
but, almost by excess of sweetness, his influence was such that my body, which was then 
utterly given over to his governance, often moved like a heavy, inanimate object. So it is plain 
that in her greeting resided all my joy, which often exceeded and overflowed my capacity.107 
VI. The Creative Power of Beauty and Love 
In the above example of the transporting quality of beauty that awakens love there is 
nothing of that falsified beauty that we call seduction: that manipulative effort to subject the 
beholder to one’s own power, thereby reducing him to an object, much as feminists perceive 
men to have done to women throughout the centuries. Instead of respectfully (indeed, 
lovingly) receiving the other in view of forming an authentic communion of persons wherein 
both are enriched in a way that sexual fruitfulness makes explicit in exemplary (though 
certainly not exclusive!) manner, seduction allures the other in order to trap him, as it were, 
for one’s own purpose or that of another: as in the use of women’s bodies to sell everything 
from toothpaste to pornography. As such—as manipulative—seduction not only objectifies 
the other, by inciting his base desires in view of a obtaining a certain end (or profit) from him, 
it also objectifies one’s own self: at least as one is presented to the eyes of the other, namely 
in the reductive sense of the body, as an outer shell, or “packaging.” 
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From this perspective, eros is reduced to what we commonly refer today as the erotic. 
In the profound words of Pope Benedict XVI, which almost echo the insights of his 
predecessor: 
Eros, reduced to pure “sex”, has become a commodity, a mere “thing” to be bought 
and sold, or rather, man himself becomes a commodity. This is hardly man's great “yes” to the 
body. On the contrary, he now considers his body and his sexuality as the purely material part 
of himself, to be used and exploited at will. Nor does he see it as an arena for the exercise of 
his freedom, but as a mere object that he attempts, as he pleases, to make both enjoyable and 
harmless. Here we are actually dealing with a debasement of the human body: no longer is it 
integrated into our overall existential freedom; no longer is it a vital expression of our whole 
being, but it is more or less relegated to the purely biological sphere.108 
As a case in point, C. S. Lewis points us to the terrible hero of George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, who before sleeping with the heroine asks: “You like doing this? I 
don’t mean simply me; I mean the thing in itself.”  
The thing is a sensory pleasure; that is, an event occurring within one’s own body. We 
use a most unfortunate idiom when we say, of a lustful man prowling the streets, that he 
“wants a woman.” Strictly speaking, a woman is just what he does not want. He wants a piece 
of apparatus. How much he cares about the woman as such may be gauged by his attitude to 
her five minutes after fruition (one does not keep the carton after one has smoked the 
cigarettes).109 
Or, to put it in the words of blessed John Paul II, even the man who “looks” at a 
woman in such a reductive way—as a body—“makes use” of her, of her femininity, “to 
satisfy his own ‘instincts’.”110 In so doing, he simultaneously devalues or impoverishes an 
“authentic value,” namely, “that dignity to which the integral value of her femininity 
corresponds in the person in question.”111 
“The sexual instinct,” writes Karol Wojtyla, “wants to take over, to make use of 
another person, whereas love wants to give, to create a good, to bring happiness.”112 In the 
first case—which we might qualify as a “love” of concupiscence—one cannot really be said 
to suffer ecstasy, St. Thomas teaches. Because, to be more specific, he seeks to have a good 
for himself, “he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement [of love or desire] 
remains finally within him[self],” as differing from one who seeks the good of the beloved 
“for his [or her own] sake.”113 
The man, on the other hand, who is truly enraptured by a woman, in the classic sense 
of eros—that of a transporting love in the classic (heightened) sense114—does not simply 
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desire a pleasure that she might grant him. What he desires, rather, is the woman herself115: 
not as a commodity to be possessed, of course, but as a person with whom he can more fully 
or more completely express, develop, and realize his own humanity, including his proper 
sexuality. Far from debasing both herself and the man as the seducer might be thought to do, 
the beautiful woman—and truly every woman is beautiful, as is every flower—invites (again 
simply in virtue of who she is) a regard from the man that might be understood as uplifting, or 
ecstatic, in the positive sense of the term: as that which literally draws him out (ex-) of 
himself toward that which is befitting, even ennobling, of his own humanity.116 
If, moreover, she might be said to “do” this in virtue of who she is, as human and as 
female, it is obviously toward her very self (her person) that he is drawn, but not—and this is 
no minor point, for this is where we might also draw a fine line between seduction and love, 
on the one hand, and between passion and love, on the other hand—as the be all and end all. 
If, in fact, a person can never be possessed, the only proper end of the drawing attraction 
toward a person is communion with him or her: a communion wherein each might 
nevertheless more fully discover and realize the meaning of his or her own humanity and 
sexuality.  
For a human being is always first and foremost himself (“a person”), and in order not 
merely to live with another but to live by and for that other person he must continually 
discover himself in the other and the other in himself. Love is impossible for beings who are 
mutually impenetrable—only the spirituality and the “inwardness”, of persons create the 
conditions for mutual interpenetration, which enables each to live in and by the other [to 
enter, that is to say, into the other’s interiority].117 
This mutual indwelling of persons requires, of course, a willingness to freely open or 
unveil oneself to the other, in what might be understood as an authentic gift of self: a gift in 
virtue of which the other is granted entry within one’s own interiority, as it were.118 Precisely 
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this unveiling of the self provides, moreover, the occasion whereby the person might not only 
be revealed to the other, but also to him or her own self: by, that is to say, the loving regard 
that this unveiling invites from the very one to whom he or she has entrusted the mystery of 
his or her person (or interiority).  
As Balthasar once again explains in his comparison of the artist and the lover: 
A model […] disrobes before the artist in the expectation that the latter’s eye will look 
on him as no one but the artist could behold him—as even the model himself, if he chanced to 
catch a glimpse of himself in the mirror, could not see himself. […] This special gaze, which 
is possible only in the loving attention of the subject, is equally objective and idealizing. That 
these two qualities can be compatible is the grand hope of the object [who, in this case, is a 
person, and thus also a subject]. It [the person who is the object of the other’s regard] hopes to 
attain in the space of another the ideality that it [he or she] can never realize in itself [him- or 
herself]. It [he or she] knows or guesses what it [he or she] could be, what splendid 
possibilities are present in it [him or her]. But in order to develop these possibilities, it [he or 
she] needs someone who believes in them—no, who sees them already existing in a hidden 
state, where, however, they are visible only to one who firmly holds that they can be realized; 
to one, in other words, who believes and loves. Many wait only for someone to love them in 
order to become who they always could have been from the beginning. It may also be that the 
lover, with his mysterious, creative gaze, is the first to discover in the beloved possibilities 
completely unknown to their possessor, to whom they would have appeared incredible.119 
This simultaneously objective and ideal (realist and transcendental: metaphysical) 
regard of the beloved in the eyes of the lover is, Balthasar insists, “as much subjective as it is 
objective. Its subjectivity does not consist in the fact that, say, it does not conform to the truth; 
it is subjective because its truth attains to real, objective truth only through a subject, just as a 
fruit can come to maturity only in a certain climate.”120 By this the Swiss theologian means, 
more specifically, that the lover “conceives [erzeugt] an image” of the beloved which the 
latter would not otherwise have necessarily accredited to him- or herself, and “when love is 
genuine and faithful,” it gives the beloved the power to approach it in likeness. The beloved 
“does not want to disappoint; he wants to show himself grateful that someone takes him so 
seriously and expects so much of him [or her].”121 
To be sure, the human lover does not create the good and the beauty within the 
beloved;122 rather, he perceives, affirms and rejoices over it: over, that is to say, the beloved 
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him- or herself, who is manifest to the lover as good and beautiful. This perception accounts 
for the objective dimension of the love: “We must have experienced and ‘seen’ that the other 
person, as well as his existence in this world, really is good and wonderful; that is the 
precondition for the impulse of the will that says, ‘It’s good that you exist!’”123 Or as 
Balthasar would have it: “The image was only concealed in the beloved, and the eyes of love 
had to come and raise it from the depths.”124 On the other hand, in the experience of sensual 
beauty, we are not simply referred “to something that is “present and discernible.” Far from 
arriving at some sort of satisfaction of our desire, the experience of beauty awakens one to 
“expectation”: “We do not see or partake of a fulfilment,” Pieper explains, “but of a 
promise.”125 
What precisely is anticipated, Pieper suggests, is the lover’s union with the beloved. 
The delightful cry of affirmation, “It’s good that you exist!” expresses the lover’s specific 
desire to be one with the beloved. And, “This once again confirms, from another angle, that 
love’s act of approval is not intended as mere verification; rather, it is an impulse of the will 
that takes the person of the other as its partner and is involved in the other himself’.”126 Such 
is thus also an invitation that the lover bestows upon the beloved. His is not only an objective 
love; it is also an ideal one: a summoning, or encouraging, love; a love which Pieper 
perceives as “a continuation and in a certain sense even a perfecting of what was begun in the 
course of creation” when the divine Artist brought forth the universe by his Word (the Son) 
and, by the same Word, affirmed that it was “very good” (Gen 1: 31).127 
As for the beloved, who consciously experiences this simultaneously realist and 
idealist love, Pieper imagines him responding in the words provided by Robert O. Johann: “I 
need you in order to be myself. . . . In loving me you give me myself, you let me be’.”128 
Certainly, this does not literally mean, as Dean Martin put it in his 1960 hit: “You’re nobody 
‘till somebody loves you.” To assent to any such proposition would be to deny the objective 
dimension of love: to the fact that it is not simply founded upon an idealized (even idolized) 
image of the beloved, but upon the actual impressed image of the beloved in the mind’s “eye” 
of the lover; for as Pieper would rightly have it, “there can be no true love without approving 
contemplation.”129 Balthasar nonetheless suggests that the beloved knows that “the realization 
of his best potentialities is, not his merit, but the creative work of love, which impelled him to 
realize them, held before him the mirror and the ideal image, and bestowed the strength to 
attain the goal.” Hence, and in short, “In this creative happening”—that of the dynamic 
encounter of lover and beloved—every distinction between subjective and objective becomes 
meaningless.”130 Within the parameters of love, it is true to affirm: “It is in the Thou […] that 
we find our I.”131 
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VII. Conclusion: Christ, the Divine Archetype and the Moral Norm 
If the particular love of eros between man and woman is, as Pieper and Balthasar 
suggest, paradigmatic of what the latter calls the “basic law” of human existence (namely that 
it is in the “Thou” that we find our “I”), it is in the love of God revealed by Christ that this 
“law” receives “its full truth.”132 By this affirmation Balthasar means more specifically that 
“The archetype of every creature lies in God, and, because it is conceived and beheld by God, 
this archetype contains and expresses the entire plenitude of the creature’s perfection (which 
is possible only in God).”133 Hence, in the revelation of his glory in his incarnate Son, whom 
Balthasar fittingly presents as the Creator’s “greatest work of art,”134 God might be thought of 
as simultaneously affirming our natural goodness and beauty and encouraging their growth 
and development. He who is “the image of the invisible God” (Col 1:15) in whom “all things 
were created” (v. 16) is also “the first-born of all creation” (v. 15), the One who—John Paul II 
reminds in Veritatis Splendor (as he so often did throughout his pontificate)—“fully discloses 
man to himself and unfolds his noble calling by revealing the mystery of the Father and the 
Father's love”.135 
“The one who is Beauty itself,” writes Pope Benedict XVI, allowed himself “to be 
slapped in the face, spat upon, crowned with thorns,” precisely so that in his “so disfigured” 
face there might appear “genuine, extreme beauty: the beauty of love that goes ‘to the very 
end’” (cf. Jn 13:1). “Whoever has perceived this beauty knows that truth, not falsehood, is the 
real aspiration of the world.”136 Whoever, in other words, has perceived this “(literally) ‘trans-
porting’ beauty,”137 knows not only the beauty of divine love, but also the beauty of his or her 
own humanity: a humanity, whom God did not hesitate to assume for the purpose of likening 
us unto himself in a manner that profoundly respects our freedom. 
In the powerful words of John Paul II: 
Christ, precisely as the crucified one, is the Word that does not pass away, and He is 
the one who stands at the door and knocks at the heart of every man, without restricting his 
freedom, but instead seeking to draw from this very freedom love, which is not only an act of 
solidarity with the suffering Son of man, but also a kind of “mercy” shown by each one of us 
to the Son of the eternal Father. In the whole of this messianic program of Christ, in the whole 
revelation of mercy through the cross, could man’s dignity be more highly respected and 
ennobled, for, in obtaining mercy, He is in a sense the one who at the same time “shows 
mercy”?138 
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Precisely in this revelation of the infinite love of God in the Cross of Calvary, the 
human person thus comes to understand the profound mystery of his or her own desires: the 
fact that we naturally long “for love more than for freedom.”139 These words published in 
1960—nearly twenty years before John Paul II’s pontificate began in 1978—were echoed all 
the louder in his first encyclical: 
“Man cannot live without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for 
himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he 
does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate intimately in it. This […] 
is why Christ the Redeemer “fully reveals man to himself”. If we may use the expression, this 
is the human dimension of the mystery of the Redemption. In this dimension man finds again 
the greatness, dignity and value that belong to his humanity.”140 
It is not simply the revelation of our humanity that is accomplished by the magnificent 
gift of his death on the Cross, however; for Christ simultaneously elevates it (especially 
human freedom) by entrusting us with his own Spirit, through whom “he gives the grace to 
share his own life and love and provides the strength to bear witness to that love in personal 
choices and actions (cf. Jn 13: 34-35).” In precisely this way, “He himself becomes,” as we 
read in  Veritatis Splendor, “a living and personal law, who invites people to follow him.” 141 
Hence: 
[Whoever] wishes to understand himself thoroughly—not just in accordance with 
immediate, partial, often superficial and even illusory standards and measures of his being—
must with his unrest, uncertainty and even his weakness and sinfulness, with his life and 
death, draw near to Christ. He must, so to speak, enter him with all his own self; he must 
“appropriate” and assimilate the whole of the reality of the incarnation and redemption in 
order to find himself.142 
It is thus obvious for one who has discovered him- or herself in Christ and who lives 
by his (Christ’s) Spirit, that the divine Artist does not so much act upon us, as within us (cf. 
Gal 2:20): in, that is to say, a manner that profoundly respects our freedom. It is, after all, by 
“performing morally good acts” that the Christian is said by John Paul II to “strengthen, 
develop and consolidate” his or her “likeness to God.”143 He or she is therefore both “artist 
and artifact.”144 
From this perspective—that of  Veritatis Splendor—there is no better way to bring 
about a cultural appreciation for the beauty of the truth than to be enraptured by it.145 Love is 
possessed only when it is given away, and beauty is seen only when one is surrendered to it. It 
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is by living in accord with the truth of our own humanity (and thus also our sexuality), as it 
might be discovered in the natural law and still more profoundly in Christian revelation, that 
we will increasingly discover its meaning and lead others to do the same. For, while “the 
splendour of truth shines forth in all the works of the Creator,” it shines “in a special way, in 
man, created in the image and likeness of God (cf. Gen 1:26).”146 Discovering and 
experiencing this splendour nonetheless requires that we take time to listen and contemplate 
the Creator’s mind in his creation—including the creation of our very persons—and thus also 
his intentions for our lives. This, in turn, means letting go of all that deafens our hearing and 
obscures our sight from the perception of beauty and truth. This requires faith: a profound 
trust in God’s goodness and his power. It also requires humility, because what is given does 
not originate within us. We have claim to it only as having received it.147 Yes, this is pure and 
simple gift, but gift calls to gift as “deep calls to deep” (Ps 42:7). And if we are not to be 
slaves to our own freedom, we must, as John Paul II so aptly expressed it, be “free with the 
very freedom of the gift.”148 
In the final analysis, the woman of faith will discover herself neither in a heavy block 
of stone (an image of naturalism in the reduced “form” of physicalism), nor in modern man 
who—as the history of modern feminism would have it—risks reducing her to a projection of 
either himself or of his interests upon her (as in the Sartrian brand of existentialism), far less 
still in her isolated self (modern idealism). Rather, it is in the affectionate regard of the lover, 
who keenly perceives her natural beauty and goodness and simultaneously encourages her to 
become who she is—the beloved (indeed, the chosen) one who is invited by his love to love 
in return149—that she will most fully discover the mystery of her own humanity and thus also 
of her sexuality. Precisely this realist vision—which Balthasar suggests is as much 
transcendent as it is objective—is a paradigm of the love of God in Christ Jesus: the divine 
Archetype in whom we were chosen “before the foundation of the world, that we should be 
holy and blameless before him” (Eph 1: 4). If, however, we have perceived, in his loving 
regard, the affirmation of our natural goodness and beauty and have heeded his call to live 
accordingly, this is because we have been enraptured and transported by “the light of God’s 
face shin[ing] in all its beauty on the countenance of Jesus Christ.”150 
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